We propose a simple privacy-preserving reformulation of a linear program whose equality constraint matrix is partitioned into groups of rows. Each group of matrix rows and its corresponding right hand side vector are owned by a distinct private entity that is unwilling to share or make public its row group or right hand side vector. By multiplying each privately held constraint group by an appropriately generated and privately held random matrix, the original linear program is transformed into an equivalent one that does not reveal any of the privately held data or make it public. The solution vector of the transformed secure linear program is publicly generated and is available to all entities.
INTRODUCTION
Recent interest in privacy-preserving classification and data mining [15, 13, 14, 6, 2, 10, 8, 9, 12] , wherein the data to be classified or mined is owned by different entities that are unwilling to reveal the data they hold or make it public, has spread to the field of optimization and in particular linear programming [3, 12, 1, 7] . In [1] a number of shortcomings in the privacy-preserving linear programming literature are pointed out. In [7] a method for handling privately held vertical partitions of a linear programming constraint matrix and cost vector is proposed that is based on private random transformations of the corresponding problem variables. In this work we deal with a horizontal partition of the equality constraint matrix of a linear program and the corresponding right hand side vector into groups. Each group is owned by a distinct entity wishing to keep its data private, but at the same time wanting a solution to the overall problem based on all the constraints. We address this problem by multiplying each privately held equality constraint by an appropriate and privately generated and held random matrix. This process transforms the original linear program into an equivalent secure linear program that does not reveal any of the privately held data or make it public. The solution vector is then generated publicly and is made available to all entities.
We briefly describe the contents of the paper. In Section 2 we give the theory and in Section 3 an implementation of our method for a privacy-preserving linear programming formulation using a random transformation of the problem constraints. In Section 4 we give numerical examples demonstrating our approach. Section 5 concludes the paper with an open problem.
We describe our notation now. All vectors will be column vectors unless transposed to a row vector by a prime ′ . For a vector x ∈ R n the notation x j will signify either the j-th component or j-th block of components. The scalar (inner) product of two vectors x and y in the n-dimensional real space R n will be denoted by x ′ y. The notation A ∈ R m×n will signify a real m × n matrix. For such a matrix, A ′ will denote the transpose of A, A i will denote the i-th row or i-th block of rows of A and A · j the j-th column or the j-th block of columns of A. A vector of zeros in a real space of arbitrary dimension will be denoted by 0. owned" by a distinct entity that is unwilling to make this block of data public or share it with the other entities. We wish to solve this linear program without revealing any privately held data. We shall achieve this by proceeding as follows. Each of the p entities chooses its own privately held random matrix
We note immediately that the rank of the randomly generated matrix B ∈ R k×m with k ≥ m is m [4] , which is the reason for choosing k ≥ m. Utilizing this fact we define the following transformations:
and
With these transformations our original linear program (2.1) turns into the following "secure" linear program:
We use the term "secure" to describe the transformed linear program (2.5) because it does not reveal any of the privately held data Proof Beause the rank of the random matrix B of (2.2) is m the following equivalence is obvious:
Consequently the feasible region X of the original linear program (2.1) is equivalent to the feasible region Y of the secure linear program (2.5). Since both objective functions are the same, it follows immediately that both problems have the same solution set.
We turn now to an explicit implementation of the secure linear programming formulation (2.5).
Starting with the linear program (2.1) that is partitioned among p entities as described in Section 2, we propose the following algorithm for generating a solution to the linear program without disclosing any of the privately held data. 
as well as the right hand side for (2.5) : We turn now to some computational results.
Computational Results
We demonstrate our results by solving two examples as follows on a 4 Gigabyte machine running i386 rhe15 Linux. We utilize the CPLEX linear programming code [5] within MATLAB [11] to solve our linear programs. The first example has 600 constraints and 1000 variables, while the second example has 1000 variables and 1000 constraints. For both examples, the components of the matrix A were uniformly distributed in the interval [−50, 50] , and approximately half of the components of the primal solution x of (2.1) were uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 10] while the other half was zero. Similarly, approximately half of the constraints of the dual problem were active, that is satisfied as equalities, while the other half were inactive. We used k = 1000 in both examples. 
Conclusion and Outlook
We have shown how to securely solve a linear program when its equality constraint matrix and its right hand side data are partitioned among entities unwilling to share their data or make it public. Another interesting problem in this realm occurs when the equality constraints of the linear program (2.1) are inequality constraints instead. The approach proposed here does not work because we cannot multiply these inequality constraints by a random matrix B ∈ R k×m , even if B ≥ 0, and preserve the original feasible region of the problem. We leave this as an open problem for future research.
